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The Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled on 28 February 2019 that the
criminalization of “facilitating illegal immigration” – introduced by the so-called Stop
Soros legislative package targeting human rights NGOs – does not violate the
Fundamental Law. Shocking as it may seem at first glance, the judgment seems to
mitigate the effects of the law by giving it a specific interpretation largely compatible
with international human rights standards. This case, however, reminds us again
how difficult it is to evaluate the judgments of a constitutional court operating in an
illiberal political regime.
Context
Shortly after the entry into office of the Fidesz-KDNP majority in the spring of 2018
after a third consecutive land-slide victory, the National Assembly adopted the
Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law which inserted – inter alia – certain
provisions in the constitutional text on the protection of national identity and the
prevention of illegal immigration. Despite their strong wording and sentimental tone,
these provisions carry little if any normative content. Nevertheless, it was a perfect
lead-up to the introduction of the so-called Stop Soros legislative package.
One of the elements of the package was the criminalization of “facilitating illegal
immigration”, which extended the already existing prohibitions of the Criminal Code
to all types of organizational activities not directly related to illegal immigration.
The Venice Commission and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) expressed serious concerns regarding this piece of legislation for
its incompatibility with the freedoms of expression and association and concluded
that “the provision may result in further arbitrary restrictions to and prohibition
through heavy sanctions of the indispensable work of human rights NGOs and
leave migrants without essential services provided by such NGOs.” Any doubts that
the political motivation behind the law was the intimidation of human rights NGOs
providing assistance to asylum seekers, must have evaporated after the introduction
of a special 25% tax on “immigration-supporting activities” – another legislative
measure strongly criticized by the Venice Commission and ODIHR. The European
Commission was not particularly happy with the Stop Soros legislative package
either and initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary which entered in its
second phase in January 2019. The European Court of Human Rights is currently
a passive spectator of the show given the fact that the petition of certain NGOs
potentially affected by the law has been found inadmissible for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies. So, this is the brief summary of the context in light of which one
needs to read the decision of the Constitutional Court.
- 1 -
Decision
At first glance the Constitutional Court’s decision on the criminalization of “facilitating
illegal immigration” seems to be perfectly in line with the political will of the governing
majority manifested in several legislative measures discussed above.  First of all,
it finds the challenged provisions compatible with the Fundamental Law despite
the fact that the argument of the petitioner (Amnesty International Hungary) was
supported by the opinions of the Venice Commission and ODIHR and the European
Commission. The petition was rejected on every ground: lack of clarity of the law,
violations of the freedoms of expression and association and the nullum crimen
principle. Second, the justices adopted an approving tone and did not criticize for a
moment the legislative measures of the government. On the contrary, in para. 43 the
Court acknowledges that the Seventh Amendment was a necessary response to the
challenges to border protection presented by the massive and uncontrolled influx of
immigrants since 2015, which in turn provided a legal basis for the enactment of the
challenged provisions. In addition, the reasoning creates the impression that the law
is in line with the relevant EU legislation.
And yet, it seems that the Constitutional Court’s decision mitigates the most
concerning potential effects of the law on human rights NGOs. Without revealing
what they were doing exactly, the justices went through all the challenged provisions
and gave them a restrictive interpretation. They clarified that the crime may only be
committed intentionally and with the specific aim of facilitating illegal immigration.
Criminal responsibility for engaging in activities in support of asylum and residence
applications may only be established if the perpetrator was aware of the fact that
he/she was providing assistance to a person who does not meet the definition of a
refugee and is thus not eligible for protection or knew that the person’s residence
in Hungary would be unlawful. The decision made clear that legal representation of
clients is not covered by the law.
The Court further stressed that the criminal prohibition extends to the expression of
one’s opinion only as far as the aim of the speech is to incite others to commit an
illegal act. The participation in public debate on and dissemination of information
about immigration is not prohibited. It was equally pointed out that civil society
organizations have the right to pursue activities in order to defend human rights
which also extends to providing assistance to asylum-seekers. The Court stated that
the criminalization of charitable activities in support of vulnerable people would be
contrary to the Fundamental Law. This last statement was declared a constitutional
requirement stemming from the Fundamental Law and having erga omnes legal
force.
Evaluation
While reading the judgment of the Constitutional Court I could not stop thinking about
what one of my professors had told me a few years ago: “You know, Viktor, what I
am really afraid of is the return of the ‘red tail’ in the academic literature.” The “red
tail” was the product of a tacit agreement between the communist political power
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and those scholars who were eager to produce valuable scientific contributions. In
exchange for paying lip service to the Marxist ideology in their papers, researchers
were granted some degree of autonomy and freedom from political interference.
A practiced eye could distinguish between the ideological nonsense and the core
argument of the author. Since I was born after the change of regime, my eyes did not
get such training. Nonetheless, while going through the judgment I had the feeling
that political jibber jabber was mixed with decent legal reasoning. Does it mean the
return of the red tail, but in the jurisprudence of the Court? Or is it something else?
I wish I could give a definitive answer, but the interpretation and the evaluation
of the Court’s jurisprudence presents a puzzle even for those who have a much
deeper knowledge of constitutional law than I do. According to the most benevolent
interpretation, in this specific case the Constitutional Court tried to find a fair
compromise between avoiding direct confrontation with the governing majority and
offering constitutional protection to human rights NGOs. It is true that the criminal
provisions raising very serious constitutional concerns were left on the books,
but they seem to have been deprived of their dangerous content by the Court’s
interpretation. In addition, the justices explicitly stated that ordinary courts applying
the criminal provisions cannot arrive at a conclusion contrary to the decision of
the Constitutional Court. Such a benevolent interpretation would mean that the
present decision is the manifestation of the Constitutional Court’s conscience and
commitment to constitutionalism. However, a rival interpretation also makes sense.
As it was briefly mentioned above, the European Commission has entered its
infringement procedure against Hungary concerning the Stop Soros legislative
package in the next phase in January 2019. This decision of the Constitutional
Court can save the face of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition in this situation, because it
not only strengthens the government’s argument that there is nothing wrong with
the adopted legislation, but also shows the Constitutional Court’s readiness to give
a helping hand to NGOs in times of uncertainty. Making sense of the Constitutional
Court’s jurisprudence nowadays certainly is a puzzle, but I do not think it would
be an unsolvable one. We “just” need to change our mindset. If we acknowledge
that the Hungarian Constitutional Court operates in an illiberal political regime, we
cannot pretend that its jurisprudence can be analyzed, interpreted and evaluated in a
methodological framework applicable in well-established constitutional democracies.
I believe that scholarly works focusing on judicial review in authoritarian regimes can
help us develop a more sophisticated research toolkit. So let’s buckle down and read
more Trochev, Issacharoff, Ginsburg, Moustafa and co.
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